The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation
Principle in State Property Law
David A. Danat
This Article explains how excessive fragmentation of property interests in mortgages has prevented reasonable modifications in loan terms and helped to create the
currentforeclosure crisis. The Article argues that Anglo-American property law reflects
an antifragmentationprinciple.This principle offers historical grounding for and constitutionallegitimacy to proposals to restructurethe servicing of troubled loans so as to
produce loan modifications when doing so would produce more net economic value
than foreclosure. The Article also considers some reforms that could be adopted to
prevent future cycles of excessive fragmentationof property interests in mortgages.

INTRODUCTION

One out of every ten houses in the United States is likely to burn
down. Figuratively, that is. These houses are "owned" by someone who
has been or is at real risk of being foreclosed upon by the servicer of a
mortgage on his home.' Moreover, one in five homeowners in the United
States will likely be "underwater" before housing prices bottom-that is,
the market value of the home will be less than the amount borrowed
with the house as collateral.2 These foreclosures, in turn, are wreaking
havoc even on neighbors whose mortgages are not in default, just as fire
in one house can easily damage the house next door. Foreclosures are
driving down housing prices for non-foreclosed-upon properties, and
leaving unoccupied, uncared-for properties that invite vandalism and
criminal activity. And, of course, there are very high social costs that
arise from the dislocation of families from their homes.
The measures that states and localities have so far tried to stem
the foreclosure crisis are very unlikely to work. Cities have threatened
to bring or have brought public nuisance claims against lenders who
allegedly made loans to borrowers they knew could not pay, did not
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1

Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working toward a Solution, March

OversightReport 1 (Mar 6,2009) ("Oversight Report"), online at httpJ/cop.senate.gov/documents/
cop-030609-report.pdf (visited Aug 31, 2009) ("Over the next few years, an estimated one in
every nine homeowners is likely to be in foreclosure.").
2
Id ("[Olne in five [homeowners] will likely have a mortgage that is higher than their
house is worth, making default a financially rational alternative.").
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understand the risks, or both.' States have also looked to foreclosure
moratoria as a means of slowing dislocations and encouraging loan
modifications.' Neither of these measures will yield much more than
publicity for the plight of communities engulfed in foreclosures.
To deal effectively with the foreclosure crisis, legislation is needed
to address a major reason that servicers have resisted making effective
loan modifications that could keep at least some struggling borrowers
in their homes. That reason is the excessive legal fragmentation of individual mortgages. By virtue of the revolution in the mortgage industry and mortgage markets in just the last few decades, a range of parties often have some kind of "right" or economic stake in the secured
credit on any given home. These parties often have conflicting interests, and as a result, servicers are unwilling or unable to rework loans
in cases where borrowers can and would make reasonable payments
(that is, payments that take some account of the dramatic drop in
housing values). In effect, "we"-our society, that is-have made with
mortgages the same mistake that feudal society made with respect to
property in land: allowing private parties to divide up a key kind of
property in so many ways and so intricately that the transaction costs
are just too high for rational, timely decisions to be made about the
property when conditions change. The current mortgage crisis is an
incarnation of what might be called "the feudal mistake."'
There is a possible solution, and it necessarily must be both legislative and federal. Congress should enact legislation that removes the
loan modification process from the current servicers and vests it in
neutral, economically disinterested agents who will make loan modification decisions as if-using the criteria that would be used if-they
owned all the interests in the individual mortgages at risk. The states
cannot undertake this reform, but state law, and in particular the
common law of property, can provide historical legitimacy for any
such federal effort. State law reflects an antifragmentation principle in
the form of the rule against perpetuities and in other rules of deed and
will construction. State oil and gas field unitization laws have operated
in accord with such an antifragmentation principle as well. The propSee notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
See, for example, California Foreclosure Prevention Act, Cal Civil Code
H§ 2923.52-2923.53 (West) (mandating a foreclosure delay of ninety days unless certain loan
modification measures are taken).
5 See David Dana, The Feudal Mistake, Huffington Post (Dec 8, 2008), online at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-danalthe-feudal-mistake_b_149377.html (visited Oct 17,
2009) (describing the myriad of interests in and divisions of property during feudal times that
made the property useless to all).
3
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erty law tradition of legal intervention to combat excessive fragmentation bolsters the argument that federal legislation transferring the servicing of mortgages would not be a taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly evaluates public
nuisance litigation and temporary mortgage moratoria as responses to
the foreclosure crisis. Part II explains how changes in the mortgage
industry have impeded significant efforts to modify loans in a way that
would actually leave borrowers able and willing to maintain payments
on the modified loans, rather than simply redefaulting. It also outlines
a proposal to restructure the servicing of troubled loans by making
modification decisions replicate those that would be made in the absence of excessive fragmentation. Part III develops the argument that
Anglo-American property law reflects an antifragmentation principle.
Part IV outlines the argument that dramatic federal intervention to
address excessive fragmentation of property in mortgages would not
constitute a regulatory taking.
I. STATE MEASURES THAT WILL NOT WORK
A.

Public Nuisance Suits

One possible response to the foreclosure crisis would be for hardhit cities and states to seek financial recovery from the originators,

securitizers, and investors in mortgages and then use the recovered
money to help homeowners and others, as well as to meet the property tax shortfall and other budgetary problems arising from the housing
crisis. Cleveland is pursuing this strategy aggressively.' The most im-

mediate problem for these lawsuits is that they lack a workable legal
theory. It appears there has been some actionable fraud in mortgage
origination in Cleveland and elsewhere,' but fraud is hard to prove
and many of the deepest pockets in these lawsuits are far too removed
from the mortgage brokers and originators to be legally responsible
6
For a description of the lawsuit, see Richard 0. Faulk, John S. Gray, and Diana P. Larson,
A Sub-prime Tort? Public Nuisance an Unfit Tool for Lending Regulation *5-7 (Washington Legal
Foundation Working Paper No 158, Aug 2008), online at http://www.gardere.com/Content/
hubbard/tbls3lPublications/FileUploadl37/2084/FaulkGray LarsonSubPrime.pdf
(visited
Oct 26, 2009). For a description of another major effort to stretch the traditional boundaries of
public nuisance, see David A. Dana, The Mismatch between Public Nuisance Law and Global
Warming *5-11 (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No 08-16, May 2008), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129838 (visited Oct 17, 2009) (questioning whether the political question
doctrine should bar courts from using public nuisance to address climate change issues).
7
See Faulk, A Sub-prime Tort? at *6 (cited in note 6).
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for fraudulent representations made to mortgage applicants. As a result, Cleveland has grounded its suit in public nuisance," a category of
tort for which no showing of intent is required.
Characterizing the mortgage origination, securitization, and investment as a public nuisance, however, stretches "public nuisance"
beyond even what a sympathetic court would (or I think, should) allow. Because public nuisance is a strict liability tort, in the sense that it
does not require a showing of bad intent or lack of due care, courts
have resisted efforts to recast products liability law as a form of public
nuisance law,o and for the same reason they would be reluctant to recast consumer fraud and securities fraud as a form of public nuisance.
Federal preemption is also a problem for these public nuisance claims
against federal or international financial actors. Finally, even public
nuisance claims necessitate a showing of causation, and the causes of
mortgage defaults and foreclosures are certainly multiple. The common law places on the plaintiff in a public nuisance suit the very
daunting burden of showing that the mortgage originator, servicer, or
investor is the but-for cause of the default and foreclosure.
B.

Mortgage Moratoria

States traditionally have set the procedures and substantive standards regarding mortgage foreclosure as part of their general role as
the source of real property law. For example, state law governs how
foreclosure sales must be conducted, how much time a defaulting borrower has to repurchase his foreclosed-upon home as a matter of right
after the foreclosure sale, and to what extent defaulting homeowners
can be held liable for deficiencies between the outstanding principal
owed and the foreclosure proceeds.
Building on this traditional role, states have sometimes responded to economic crises by attempting to alter the foreclosure rules and
standards to help borrowers in trouble. Prior to the current foreclosure crisis, the two most notable waves of state law foreclosure relief
occurred during the Great Depression and the farm crisis of the 1980s.

Id at *5.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B, comment d (1979).
10 For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court recently rejected efforts to characterize

8

9

lead paint in homes as a public nuisance. See State v Lead Industries Association, Inc, 951 A2d

428, 435 (RI 2008) ("[D]efendants were not in control of any lead [paint] at the time the lead
caused harm ... , [which made] defendants unable to abate the alleged nuisance, the standard
remedy in a public nuisance action.").
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In both cases, the states opted for temporary moratoria on mortgage
foreclosures, and sometimes they instituted successive moratoria."
States have responded to the current foreclosure crisis with moratoria, and, as is often true, California has been at the vanguard. California
adopted a statute that uses the stick of a moratorium to incentivize banks
to modify loans. Under the California Foreclosure Prevention Act, banks
are required to delay foreclosure actions by ninety days unless they adopt
a comprehensive loan modification program that includes such measures
as interest rate reductions and deferral or reduction of the principal."
The states, however, face substantial legal obstacles in pursuing a
strategy of increasing the costs of foreclosure as a means of pressuring
lenders to engage in additional, more generous loan modification. For
one thing, states are preempted from regulating national banks or
their affiliates, and a large share of the mortgages in every state have
been originated or partly held or serviced by such institutions." By
pressuring banks to engage in loan modification, the California legislation would seem to qualify more as loan and capital regulation (the
exclusive domain of the federal government with respect to national
banks and their affiliates) than property law and contract law (traditionally, and still largely, the domain of the states even with respect to
national banks and their affiliates).
The federal Constitution also poses a potential obstacle to state
moratoria. In Home Building & Loan Association v Blaisdell," the

United States Supreme Court upheld a foreclosure relief statute
enacted by Minnesota against constitutional challenge under the Contracts Clause, explaining that the protections afforded defaulting homeowners were temporary and justified by an economic emergency." And
11 See

Robert M. Lawless, The American Response to Farm Crises: Procedural Debtor

Relief, 1988 U Ill L Rev 1037, 1041-43,1049-60.
12 See California Foreclosure Prevention Act, Cal Civil Code §§ 2923.52-2923.53. See also
10 CCR §§ 2031.1-2031.10 (clarifying the application of Cal Civil Code §§ 2923.52-2923.53
through elaboration of the minimum requirements for a comprehensive loan modification program under Cal Civil Code § 2923.53).
13 For the United States Supreme Court's most recent preemption decision in the banking
area, which embraces an expansive vision of the scope for federal preemption, see Watters v
Wachovia Bank, 550 US 1, 21 (2007) (concluding that the National Bank Act "protect[s] from
state hindrance a national bank's engagement in the 'business of banking' whether conducted by
the bank itself or by an operating subsidiary"). But see Cuomo v Clearing House Association,
129 S Ct 2710, 2721 (2009) (concluding that the National Bank Act preempts a state's visitorial
powers but not its power to prosecute enforcement actions in state courts).
14 290 US 398 (1934).
15 Id at 444-48 ("We are of the opinion that the Minnesota statute as here applied does not
violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution."). For a summary of the relevant state and
federal case law, see generally Mortgage Foreclosure Forbearance Statutes-Modern Status, 83 ALR
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much more recently, the Court upheld a temporary moratorium on
construction in the Lake Tahoe region on the theory that local regulators needed flexibility to develop the best means of reconciling private
property owners' interests and the need to prevent environmental
degradation." These precedents might suggest that California and other states have leeway under the federal Constitution to institute temporary moratoria as long as such moratoria are styled as temporary
and do not de facto become long-term or semipermanent.
But that is exactly the problem: truly temporary moratoria will
accomplish nothing or next to nothing. Of course, moratoria could
sometimes be helpful while other significant reforms are being put in
place." However, the pressure and costs of delay in foreclosure due to
moratoria, by themselves, are not enough to overcome the obstacles to
meaningful loan modifications, including the conflicting interests
among interest holders in mortgages. And, at the end of the moratoria,
borrowers, therefore, will likely just face more late payments and penalties than before the moratoria. As a result, we are likely to observe
a wave of foreclosures once state moratoria end."
II. EXCESSIVE FRAGMENTATION AS A CAUSE OF THE MORTGAGE
CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

A. Too Many Players, Too Many Conflicts
In the "old days" of residential mortgage financing, the relevant
players with respect to the secured credit on a home were simply "the
bank" and "the borrower." The bank originated the mortgage, serviced
it, and owned it. The borrower paid principal and interest to the bank,
and that was that. In this regime, the bank would modify a troubled
loan if it could reasonably predict that the stream of payments the
borrower could make under a modified loan would yield more net
profit (or less net loss) than would result from foreclosure. The bank
rationally would agree to significant loan modification, even principal
4th 243 (1991). See also Roland C Amundson and Lewis I Rotman, Depression JurisprudenceRevisited-Minnesota's Moratoriwnon MortgageForeclosure,10 Wm Mitchell L Rev 805,821-26 (1984).
16 See Tahoe-Sierra PreservationCouncil, Inc v Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 535 US

302, 334-36 (2002) (concluding that a rule prohibiting moratoria "would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking").
17 See Oversight Report at 61-63 (cited in note 1).
18

See, for example, Alan Zibel, US Foreclosuresup 24 Percent in 1st Quarter, USA Today

(Apr 16, 2009), online at http://content.usatoday.net/dist/custom/gcillnsidePage.aspx?cld=daily
tribune&sParam=30561303.story (visited Oct 1,2009).
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reduction, in order to avoid foreclosure where housing prices had
dropped substantially since the origination of the mortgage.
That has all changed. Now, with respect to the secured credit on a
single home, there are a host of actors with an economic interest in
whether or how the loan is paid back, modified, or both. Mortgages
now are most often serviced by an entity that holds no direct or indirect
interest in the mortgage or mortgages on the property. Moreover, a
large percentage of first mortgages in the United States in recent years
have been pooled, and each pool has been securitized. The securities in
each pool have been divided into different "tranches" with different
credit-risk ratings and different rights to payments from the borrowers.
Tranching has occurred in a dizzying variety of approaches, but typically, for each pool, there are senior, intermediate or mezzanine, and junior
tranches. The lower tranches, moreover, typically have been resecuritized through the use of collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) or
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). CMOs and CDOs then often
have been tranched and securitized in the form of a CMO 2 or CDO2,
and then sometimes these instruments in turn have been tranched and
securitized, and on and on." By virtue of the financial alchemy of Wall
Street, a single mortgage could be-and often has been-transformed
into tens or hundreds or even thousands of distinct investment interests.
Still, there are even more interest holders to consider. At least in
theory, in some cases there could be a surplus value after all the various bondholders in a pool have been paid off. This residual interest
was also carved out and sold to yet another set of entities, called residual claimants or holders of Net Interest Margin (NIM). And on top
of all of this, Wall Street created a layer of credit default swaps, which
are insurance bet investments based on mortgage pool investments.
Finally, for many properties, a second mortgage was originated at
the same time as the first mortgage in order to allow the borrower to
avoid mortgage insurance requirements. (Second mortgages were also
originated at a later date, often part of a home equity line.) These second
mortgages became much more common in mortgages originated after
2002; by 2006, more than half of Alt-A mortgage originations also included a second mortgage.2 These second mortgages often are held by
19 See Oversight Report at 43-44 (cited in note 1); Anna Gelpern and Adam J.Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities *24-28

(Georgetown Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No 1323546, May 2009), online at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1323546 (visited Oct 26, 2009); Joshua D. Coval, Jacob Jurek, and Erik
Stafford, The Economics of Structured Finance *10-15 (Harvard Business School Working Paper
No 09-060, 2008), online at http://www.hbsedu/research/pdf/09-060.pdf (visited Oct 26,2009).
20
See Oversight Report at 41 (cited in note 1).
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parties other than those who hold first mortgages or interests in the securitized or multiply securitized pools containing the first mortgage. And to
make matters all the more difficult, second mortgages are often securitized and resecuritized in the same iterative process as first mortgages.
This incredible fragmentation of the secured credit in individual
homes impedes effective loan modification for three basic reasons:
(1) servicers have distinctive economic interests regarding the mortgages they service that make them resist effective modifications;
(2) even when servicers would pursue an effective modification of a
mortgage that is part of a securitized pool, they cannot obtain the necessary agreement of all of the owners of a direct or indirect interest
in the mortgage; and (3) even when servicers would pursue an effective modification of a first mortgage that is part of a securitized pool
and can obtain the consent of everyone who has an interest in that
mortgage, they cannot coordinate the necessary subordination of the
second mortgage on the property.
Servicers service mortgages contained in a securitized pool by virtue of contracts known as Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs).21
Because the servicer of a mortgage does not own any part of the mortgages it services, its only source of revenue related to the mortgages is a
fee it obtains from investors in the pool of securitized mortgages, and
these fees are generally based on the principal of the serviced mortgages. Servicers thus have a strong interest in not modifying loans in such a
way as to reduce principal and hence reduce fees, even when doing so
might be the only way to avoid foreclosures and might be exactly what
economically rational servicers would do if they also owned the mortgages they serviced.2 Because PSA contracts also generally provide that
servicers must cover payments to investors in the mortgage pool after
the mortgages go into default and up until the properties are foreclosed
upon," cash-strapped servicers also have an incentive to push mortgages in default to foreclosure. The fact that servicers are compensated for

21

Larry Cordell, et al, The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities, 41 UCC L

J 4 Art 2, §3 (2009).
22

See John D. Geanakoplos, Why President Obarna's Plan Will Not Work and What Will

*6-7 (Mar 19, 2009) (testimony before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Opportunity, a subset of the House Financial Services Committee), online at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/geanakoplos-testimony-_all.pdf
(visited Aug 31, 2009) ("Servicers are paid a percentage of principal for each house that is not
defaulting. That means reducing interest costs them nothing and gains them much, at least in the
short term" and "all servicers are driven by their immediate needs.").
23 Id at *7,8.
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all expenses of foreclosure, including whatever various fees they tack
on, also may lead them to proceed readily to foreclosure.24
Even when servicers want to aggressively pursue meaningful loan
modifications, including ones involving principal, the inability to coordinate and obtain consent from all the relevant investors may result in
paralysis or at best halfway measures. Many PSA contracts require a
supermajority or even unanimous consent of all interest holders in a
mortgage in order to allow a modification of the loan." Even when
that is not the case, servicers reasonably may fear liability if they act
without broad consent. Investors in senior-most tranches have no reason to support loan modification because they have priority and will
recover on their investment even with foreclosure, while those in the
most junior tranches have no reason to support modification because
they will receive nothing once a schedule of significantly reduced
payments is in place. Of course, some "in the middle" investors may
benefit from meaningful modifications but that hardly makes for unanimity or a supermajority of investors.2
Reworking the first mortgage, moreover, will not happen (and
cannot prevent foreclosures) if all of the benefits of the reworking accrue to second mortgage holders, rather than borrowers. As the Congressional Oversight Panel's report on the foreclosure crisis explained,
Unless a junior mortgagee consents to subordination, the junior
mortgage moves up in seniority upon refinancing. Out of the
money junior mortgagees will consent to subordination only if
they are paid. Thus, junior mortgages pose a serious holdup for
refinancings, demanding a ransom in order to permit a refinancing to proceed.2
Where the second mortgage has been securitized, gaining consent for
refinancing may mean in effect gaining the consent of hundreds or thousands of investors in a pool that contains the second or junior mortgage.

24 Oversight Report at 45 (cited in note 1). For an analysis of how servicers' financial interests diverge from those of investors in mortgages and result in foreclosures where loan modification would yield greater revenue, see Larry Cordell, et al, The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers:
Myths and Realities *17-19 (Finance and Economics Discussion Series working paper 2008-46,
Sept 8, 2008), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200846/200846pap.pdf
(visited Sept 3,2009).
2
Oversight Report at 43 (cited in note 1).
26
See Gelpern and Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts at *25 (cited in note 19) ("All
the benefit [of modification] accrues to the 'fulcrum' tranche that is in the money if there is a
modification, and out of the money in a foreclosure.").
27
Oversight Report at 35 (cited in note 1).
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The fragmentation of the secured credit interest in real property
described above is, to be sure, not the only impediment to meaningful
and expeditious loan modifications. There are many other reasons,
ranging from widespread job losses to concerns of publically traded
financial institutions about booking losses when principal is reduced
to the sheer number of mortgages in default or facing default.N But
fragmentation appears to be an important enough part of the story
that addressing it must be part of the solution.
Putting the Pieces Back Together

B.

Government-provided financial incentives for servicers to modify
loans, in theory, could operate to counteract their financial incentives
not to engage in meaningful principal reductions, to press for mortgages in default to go into foreclosure, or both. But such incentives
would need to be structured and calibrated properly for each major
servicer, and so far there is no evidence yet that government actors
have the information, political ability, or desire to provide the needed
incentives. Loan modifications have increased somewhat with the federal incentives for servicers that have been instituted, but the available
evidence suggests that many of these modifications are "bad" ones
that result in the servicers receiving incentive payments without modifying the loans in such a way that borrowers can (or, as a matter of
pure self-interest, should) continue to make payments rather than
redefaulting and walking away from their mortgages in the relatively
near term.2 Moreover, giving incentive payments to servicers will not
correct the barriers to meaningful reworking of mortgages that are
rooted in the difficulty of coordinating and obtaining consent from the
multiple investors who have conflicting stakes in particular properties
that have been subject to a securitized first mortgage and (often) also
a second junior mortgage or mortgages.

28
29

Id at 30-40.
See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC

and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report: Disclosure of National Bank and Federal Thrift Mortgage

Loan Data, Fourth Quarter 2008 6 (Apr 2009), online at http://files.ots.treas.gov/4820362.pdf
(visited Aug 31,2009) (finding that the majority of loan modifications did not decrease borrower's
monthly payments, and 32 percent increased monthly payments). The report also found that modifications that left payments the same or increased them were associated with redefault rates that
were double those associated with modifications that reduced monthly payments. Id at 6-8 (noting
that loan modifications that decreased monthly payments by more than 10 percent resulted in
a 22.7 percent delinquency rate compared to delinquency rates of 50.6 percent and 45.8 percent for
modifications that left payments unchanged and increased payments, respectively).
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Lauren Willis and Howell Jackson, writing separately, have suggested that the federal government cut through the mortgage securitization morass by condemning all the interests in securitized mortgages.0
Such a vast exercise of the eminent domain power could easily be tied
up in the courts, with the salient questions being what just compensation was at the time of condemnation and whether it was paid. Moreover, as the party bringing the condemnation actions, the government
would bear the burden of proving that it paid just compensation; given
the uncertainties of valuation, it matters a great deal which party has
the burden of proof. Even if there were no legal challenges, moreover,
the federal government could not plausibly attempt valuations and
hence pursue condemnations until it had assembled information
about each mortgage, borrower, and mortgage pool, which is something that would require changes to federal law. As discussed below,
once so much information has been gathered, effective reforms could
be undertaken without the further step of actual condemnation of
mortgages and interests in mortgages. Further, wholesale condemnation of mortgages and interests in mortgage pools would mean that
the federal government effectively would own the mortgages on a
huge number of homes and either would remain the nation's largest
mortgagee or would have to undertake the enormous task of remarketing mortgages in a way that did not unduly benefit some private
parties or otherwise delegitimate the government. Our politics and
political culture would almost certainly make such a massive federal
intervention in the market impossible, and we need not go to that extreme in order to address the excessive fragmentation in mortgages.
A better approach has been outlined by John Geanakoplos and
Susan Koniak.3 1 In this approach, the servicing of securitized first
30
See Lauren E. Willis, Stabilize Home Mortgage Borrowers,and the FinancialSystem Will
Follow *2 (Loyola Law School Legal Studies Paper No 2008-28, Sept 2008), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273268(visited Aug 31, 2009) (arguing that, after selling homes seized
through eminent domain back to the homeowner, "[lenders and investors would receive the
lesser of the mortgage balance or the amount paid by the government as just compensation");
Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout, Christian Sci Monitor 9 (Sept 25, 2008) ("With congressional authorization, the Treasury could force the purchase of these assets through eminent
domain and make an immediate payment of an estimate of the loans' current fair value, which
would then be later reviewed for adequacy by a judicial forum.").
31 See John D. Geanakoplos and Susan P Koniak, Mortgage Justice Is Blind, NY Times A39
(Oct 29, 2008) ("[W]e propose legislation that moves the reworking function from the paralyzed
master servicers and transfers it to community-based, government-appointed trustees.... [T]he
blind trustees would consider, loan by loan, whether a reworking would bring in more money
than a foreclosure."). See also John D. Geanakoplos and Susan P Koniak, Matters of Principal,
NY Times A31 (Mar 4, 2009). I also rely on an outline of a "Mortgage and Securities Stabilization, Recovery and Modification Program Act of 2009" based on the Geanakoplos and Koniak
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mortgages on homes would be transferred to government-appointed
trustees who would be empowered to obtain, for each mortgage, the
necessary information to determine whether the mortgage was at risk
of foreclosure absent modification of the loan terms. In cases where
the answer is found to be yes, the trustees could modify the loan (including via principal reductions), but only if doing so would reasonably be expected to yield more revenue than foreclosure. A homeowner would need to be able to demonstrate that he or she could reasonably be expected to make and sustain the payments on the modified
loan. Mortgages that did not meet the test for modification would be
allowed to proceed to foreclosure.32
In order to capitalize on the traditional knowledge that informed
lending and loan modifications before the dawning of the age of excessive fragmentation in property in mortgages, the plan would employ community bankers in a decentralized, regional approach. While
the community-based bankers would be sighted with respect to local
economic conditions and borrowers' personal profiles and histories, they
would be "blind" as to who or what institutions held interests in any of
the mortgages they were reviewing. After the blind review, mortgages
that have not been reworked and those that have would be returned to
the original servicers. Throughout this process, investors in mortgage
pools would be paid as before, except that their payments might be adjusted or even terminated on mortgages that had been modified."
proposal and authored by them as well as George Cohen. See Geanakoplos, Why President
Obama's Plan Will Not Work and What Will at *20-28 (cited in note 22) (including a bill attached

to the testimony that proposes "a program for nonconforming securitized mortgages ... that
transfers responsibility for mortgage modifications and foreclosure decisions from servicers to
government-designated, community-based trustees").
32 Another possible federal reform would be an amendment to federal bankruptcy statutes
to allow homeowners to write down the principal on their mortgages to current values as part of
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. For an extended argument on behalf of this approach, see Adam J.Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis L Rev

565,571-78,647-48 (outlining the argument and concluding that bankruptcy modification "offers
immediate relief, ... spreads burdens [to all involved], and avoids both the costs and moral hazard of a government bailout"). There are great social costs, however, in not providing mortgage
relief until homeowners are in such bad financial straits that they would be eligible and willing to
file for bankruptcy; moreover, filing for bankruptcy itself is costly and hence beyond the ability
of some homeowners who are already deeply in debt. Finally, the bankruptcy courts and bankruptcy judges do not have the institutional capacity to handle a huge wave of bankruptcy filings.
Indeed, the bankruptcy courts probably could handle such a wave only if something like a system
of government-employed trustees with backgrounds in community banking were set up at the
same time. See Alan Schwartz, Don't Let Judges Fix Loans, NY Times A27 (Feb 27, 2009) (arguing that the bankruptcy solution would "swamp bankruptcy courts," disappoint debtors, and
"worsen[] economic uncertainty").
33 In the Geanakoplos and Koniak plan, holders of second mortgages would take away
nothing when the blind trustee decides that the first mortgage is so troubled that a modification
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The blind trustee plan, in the case of any given mortgage, might
result in some unhappy investors. But under this plan, the federal government would not need to institute condemnation suits and calculate
and defend particular just compensation payments: Investors would
need to file inverse condemnation or regulatory takings suits and
would have the burden of overcoming the ripeness requirements for
regulatory takings challenges before even being able to address and
argue the merits that regulatory takings had occurred." And (as discussed below) with certain modifications, the plan would very likely
survive any regulatory takings challenges, such that the thorny issue of
just compensation could be avoided completely.
III. THE ANTIFRAGMENTATION PRINCIPLE INANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A plan to transfer the servicing of securitized mortgages to blind
government trustees would represent a very significant alteration by
the federal government of a private ordering through the means of
property and contract law. But significant alterations are not without
precedent. Perhaps most notably, President Franklin Roosevelt removed the United States from the gold standard during the Great
Depression and in effect altered thousands of contracts based on the
premise of a gold standard; the United States Supreme Court, apparently without effort or reservation, accepted that elimination of the
gold standard was constitutional." But the gold standard example has
nothing to do with excessive fragmentation; it is not evidence of our
legal culture's willingness to affirm public reorderings of private orderings so as to reduce or eliminate the negative effects of excessive fragmentation. In the following discussion I focus on examples that do suggest an antifragmentation principle or tradition in our property law."
is required. See Geanakoplos, Why PresidentObama's Plan Will Not Work and What Will at *11

(cited in note 22). I suggest a different approach to this issue below.
3
As-applied regulatory takings challenges require a final decision by the relevant regulators regarding the property interest at issue on the theory that the diminution in value borne by
the property owner cannot be ascertained until there has been a final decision. See, for example,
Suitum v Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 520 US 725,733-39 (1997).
35 See Nortz v United States, 294 US 317, 328 (1935) ("Congress has complete authority to

regulate the currency system of the country," including the "power to appropriate unto the Government outstanding gold bullion, gold coin and gold certificates.") (quotation marks omitted).
For a discussion of this case, see Gelpern and Levitin, Rewriting FrankensteinContracts at *54-56
(cited in note 19) (noting that Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes "specifically refused to characterize the gold measure as a constitutional emergency, which might have fixed its duration").
36 For an extended, thoughtful account of increasing fragmentation (without using the
word as such) of property in our law in arenas other than mortgages, see Michael Heller, The
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A. The Law of Estates in Land
The disposition of property through wills is a regime of private
ordering, but the law has trumped or constrained private ordering to
prevent excessive fragmentation of property interests in land by
means of wills or other grants. There is no "antifragmentation principle" as such in our estate law tradition, but there are a number of
doctrines that have been justified on the basis of enhancing the alienability and especially the efficient market alienability of land. These
doctrines enhance alienability precisely by limiting fragmentation of
interests in land. The implicit premise of these doctrines -as they have
come to be justified, however obscure and contested their historical
origins may be -is that private actors may not splinter property into
so many fragments that they preclude value-maximizing decisionmaking regarding the use and disposition of land.
The first such doctrine is that ambiguous grants or devises should
be read as creating a fee simple in land. The fee simple is the least
fragmented of the recognized English (and later American) estates in
land, because it combines all current possessory rights in land with all
future rights; as the least fragmented estate in land, the fee simple is
the estate in land that most facilitates investment in and market alienability of property in land. The fee simple developed out of far more
temporally fragmented interests by the fourteenth century, but the presumption with respect to ambiguous grants was that a life estate rather
than a fee simple was what the grantor or testator intended to create. In
the United States, in the nineteenth century, the presumption was
changed by statute so that ambiguous grants would be construed as
creating not a life estate, but the less fragmented, more alienable fee
simple." The preference for a fee simple can also be seen in the adoption of statutes in many of the states (beginning in the Revolutionary
era) that abolished the fee tail-an interest where land is tied up along
lines of biological issue or "heirs of my body" -and that rewrote grants
containing traditional fee tail language as creating fee simples."

Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs

Lives xiv (Basic Books 2008). (Heller does briefly mention mortgages in the preface, however.)
3
See, for example, White v Brown, 559 SW2d 938, 939-40 (Tenn 1977) (discussing how a
statute in 1851 switched the presumption under Tennessee law).
38 See Jesse Dukeminier, et al, Property 188-89 (Aspen 6th ed 2006). Where the fee tail
was reformed rather than abolished, it was done to improve transparency as to who held an
interest in the property and hence enhance alienability. For an extended treatment of these
issues, see Claire Priest, Understanding the End of Entail: Information, Institutions, and Slavery in
the American
Revolutionary Period *34 (unpublished draft, 2008), online at
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Another doctrine that is consistent with an antifragmentation
principle is the doctrine of worthier title. This doctrine addresses situations where a grantor during his or her life gives property to someone
for life (a life estate) and then to the grantor's legal heirs in succession
(who would not be known necessarily at the time of the grant). Such
grants fragment the interest in land over time, creating many possible
interest holders, and make market alienation and investment in the land
difficult." Under the doctrine of worthier title, the grants are rewritten
to provide that the life tenant has possessory rights of the land during
his or her life, but after death all the rights in the land revert back to the
grantor, and he or she has a fee simple. By facilitating the reconsolidation of the land into a fee simple held by the grantor or the grantor's
estate, the doctrine decreases fragmentation and increases market alienability. Although the doctrine of worthier title is now understood as a
doctrine of interpretation where the grantor's intent is ambiguous, it
was initially adopted and followed in this country as a mandatory rule
that applied even when it contradicted the clear intent of the grantor."
The final estate doctrine that advances an antifragmentation principle is the common law rule against perpetuities. This rule operates to
override even a clear expression of intent on the part of the grantor when
the grant fragments the interest in property so as to create distant, uncertain contingent remainders. Interests that violate the rule are simply
"crossed out," with the result that the overall fragmentation of property
in land is reduced and alienability increased. As John Chipman Gray explained in a classic treatise, "The principal object of the Rule against Perpetuities is to prevent, except within certain limits, restraints upon the
alienation of property by the owner of the present interest."4 1
B.

Statutory Unitization of Underground Oil and Gas Fields

State property law, via statutes, has expressed an antifragmentation principle most clearly in the context of oil and gas field development. Indeed, in this arena the law has overridden firm property rights
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/Priest++EntailColumbia?exclusive=filemgr.download&file-i
d=15107&showthumb=0 (visited Oct 5,2009).
39 See Dukeminier, et al, Property at 244 (cited in note 38) ("The reasons for this doctrine are
obscure, but probably it was motivated by ... [the idea that] [t]he doctrine furthers alienability.").
40 See, for example, Doctor v Hughes, 225 NY 305, 311-12 (NY 1919) (explaining that the
worthier title doctrine does not "survive[] as an absolute prohibition limiting the power of a
grantor .... [T]o transform into a remainder what would ordinarily be a reversion, the intention
to work the transformation must be clearly expressed").
41 John Chipman Gray, The Rule against Perpetuities 495 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1942) (Roland Gray, eds).
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expectations and contracts in the name of preventing a socially important asset from being inefficiently developed. The state and federal
courts, in this context, have accepted that where existing property
rights rules and private ordering result in too many parties with an
interest in the same resource, the law has a legitimate role in coercing
the multiple interest holders to act in a more unified, and hence (from
an overall return on private investment perspective) rational, manner.
Oil and gas fields are underground resources that typically can be
drained from any of a number of surface wells. Where the surface area
is held by multiple landowners, the physical reality of oil and gasthat it flows and hence can be forced to migrate in one direction or
another with enough technological investment- creates a dynamic
where neighboring landowners engage in a race to drain the entire
field, each acting out of fear that delay may result in his neighbors
getting all the oil or gas. Under the traditional rule of capture, as embodied in state statutes and common law precedents, each surface
owner owned whatever oil or gas he or she managed to withdraw."
In every major oil and natural gas producing state in the United
States except Texas, the overinvestment in drilling equipment and surface storage of oil (rather than conservation by means of leaving it
underground)" led the state legislature or an authorized state agency
to adopt some scheme of mandatory oil or natural gas field unitization. The typical unitization scheme overrode any previous contractual
arrangements between some or all of the neighboring landowners and
lessees, and required that the field be managed as a single unit and
that the costs and profits from the development of the unitary field be
distributed to individual surface landowners in proportion to the size
of their surface land holding."
Aggrieved landowners brought many constitutional challenges to
state oil and gas field unitization statutes, arguing that they effected
unconstitutional takings of private property rights and impairments of

42 See Westmoreland & Cambria NationalGas Co v DeWitt, 18 A 724,725 (Pa 1889) ("If an
adjoining, or even a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that it comes into his
well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his.").
43 For a good discussion of the various inefficiencies associated with competition among
surface landholders, see Gary D. Libecap, Unitization,in Peter Newman, ed, 3 The New Palgrave
Dictionaryof Economics and the Law 641,641 (Macmillan 1998) (arguing that "[t]he most complete solution to the common-pool problem in oil and gas reservoirs is unitization").
44 See id at 642.
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private contracts. These challenges all failed:" The state courts repeatedly affirmed unitization as a rational state response to the wasting of
the value of the oil and gas resource. For example, in Palmer Oil Corporation v Phillips Petroleum Company," the Oklahoma Supreme

Court upheld a unitization statute that allowed for mandatory unitization when the holders of 50 percent or more of the surface area of the
field petitioned for compulsory unitization. The statute was based on a
legislative finding that
it is desirable and necessary ... to authorize and provide for un-

itized management, operation and further development of [oil
and gas field properties] ... to the end that a greater ultimate re-

covery of oil and gas may be had therefrom, waste prevented,
and the correlative rights of the owners in a fuller and more
beneficial enjoyment of the oil and gas rights, protected.
The United States Supreme Court has also rejected constitutional
challenges to unitization, explaining that "a state has constitutional
power to regulate production of oil and gas so as to prevent waste and
to secure equitable apportionment among landholders of the migratory gas and oil underlying their land, fairly distributing among them the
costs of production and of the apportionment."
Mortgages, mortgage pools, and mortgage-pool insurance instruments are not the same thing as wills, or oil or gas fields; the analogy
between the antifragmentation precedents in the law of estates in
land, and in oil and gas unitization can only be taken so far. Indeed,
one could read the estate law examples as artifacts of a particular concern with avoiding family dynasties and the oil and gas precedents as a
manifestation of an undercurrent in American law that key natural
resources can be privately held but also are a subject of distinctive
public interest and control.
Law, however, evolves based on analogies, and analogies are never perfect. In the estates-in-land examples and in field unitization,
fragmentation of property interests was viewed as causing inefficien45 See Validity of Compulsory Pooling or Unitization Statute or Ordinance Requiring Owners or Lessees of Oil and Gas Lands to Develop Their Holdings as a Single Drilling Unit and the

Like, 37 ALR 2d 434,435-40 (1954) (reviewing the case law).
46
47

231 P2d 997 (Okla 1951).

Id at 1000 (quoting the Oklahoma statute) (quotation marks omitted). The United
States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision on the
grounds that it "failed to raise any substantial federal questions." Palmer Oil Corp v Amerada
Petroleum Corp, 343 US 390,391 (1952) (per curiam).
48 Hunter Co v McHugh, 320 US 222,227 (1943) (per curiam).
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cies and waste, and the law was applied to reduce fragmentation, despite that doing so disrupted private ordering and despite the fact that
there were some relative winners and losers after the law addressed
the problem of fragmentation. One could argue that all the private
interests in oil and gas fields benefit from unitization in the very long
run, but we would not have witnessed repeated litigation challenges if
that view were shared by all the affected interest holders. Viewed at a
significant but reasonable level of abstraction, the estate-in-land and
field unitization examples provide precedential support for the sort of
federal legislation that would be needed to mandate transfers of servicing of mortgages to government trustees.
IV. WOULD OVERCOMING EXCESSIVE FRAGMENTATION BY
TRANSFERRING SERVICING BE A TAKING?

If the federal government were to require that servicing of mortgages be transferred to blind trustees and some such mortgages consequently modified, would the government be held liable for having
taken private property without just compensation? Under the applicable ripeness rules, as-applied regulatory takings challenges could
only be brought by particular interest holders once it was clear how
the government program had treated or disposed of their interests. 49
But even so, the courts ultimately could be faced with a large number
of ripe takings challenges. What would the result be?
The United States Supreme Court would be the ultimate decisionmaker, and, formal doctrinal tests aside, four factors appear to
drive the Court's regulatory takings outcomes.! First, the Court is far
less deferential to uncompensated regulation in the context of real
property regulation than it is in the context of personal property regulation. Second, the Court seems to be guided in regulatory takings
cases by how important it considers the purpose and content of the
regulation at issue, and whether the regulation reasonably addresses
what the Court understands as a kind of public harm (as opposed to
public benefit). Third, the Court seems more concerned about uncom49

See, for example, Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank

of Johnson City, 473 US 172, 186 (1985) (holding the takings claim premature "[blecause the
respondent had yet to obtain a final decision regarding the application of the [ordinance and
regulations] to its property"). See also Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the
Federal Courts, 48 Vand L Rev 1, 16-26 (1995) (discussing ripeness challenges faced by plaintiffs
alleging a taking in related regulatory takings contexts).
50
This list of factors is based on my distillation of the Supreme Court case law, a body of
law that has been and remains subject to a dizzying array of interpretations. For an extended discussion, see generally David A. Dana and Thomas Merrill, Property Takings (Foundation 2002).
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pensated regulation that "picks on" a single or small group of property
owners, as opposed to a relatively broad class of citizens. Finally, the
Court appears to be willing to find a regulatory taking only when
there has been an interference with the right to exclude from real
property, or when the regulation wipes out the economic value or viable use of the property at issue.
All of these factors suggest that the mandatory transfer of servicing of mortgages to government trustees would not be deemed to effect regulatory takings -particularly, if some minimal payment were
made to any interests formally cancelled or terminated as a result of
loan modifications. Consider the first factor-whether the affected
interests are real property interests. Mortgages and even securities or
insurance on securities based on a pool of mortgages in a sense relate
to individual pieces of land. But these interests are not interests in land
in the same emotional and cultural way as the interest of the homeowners in Nollan v California Coastal Commission" or the hardware store
owner in Dolan v City of Tigard5 or the would-be homeowner and developer in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council." If it makes any

sense at all to privilege property in land for purposes of regulatory takings analysis, it is because we think "owning" a home or a farm or a
small store involves special values and deserves special protection:
when we think of such owning, we do not think of owning financial instruments such as derivatives. And, of course, private servicers (mostly
banks)-the group that might complain the most about the transfer of
servicing to government trustees-have no ownership interest in the
underlying parcels of land that would be at issue.
Saving people's homes from foreclosure that should be-and, but
for excessive fragmentation, would be-saved through reasonable
modifications is an important public purpose. Certainly, it is not hard
to document that foreclosures have adverse impacts on whole communities and not just defaulting mortgagors." Moreover, there is
51 483 US 825, 827 (1987) (holding that a lateral easement condition for a building permit
for private home renovation violated the Takings Clause).
52 512 US 374, 379 (1994) (holding that a bicycle path condition for a small, family-owned
hardware store expansion violated the Takings Clause).
53 505 US 1003, 1007 (1992) (holding that a prohibition on building of homes on two
beachfront lots likely violated the Taking Clause, unless building would constitute a common law
nuisance under state law).
54 Servicers presumably would argue that blind government trustee review and modifications nullify and hence take their contractual rights under PSAs, requiring the payment of just
compensation.
55 See, for example, Hearings on Utilizing Technology to Improve TARP and Financial
Oversight before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 111th Cong, 2d Sess 1
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precedent for recognizing the legitimate role of the federal government in providing foreclosure relief during times of economic
upheaval.'6 And, as discussed above, there are precedents for legal interventions to prevent inefficiencies that would result from excessive
fragmentation of property interests.
Third, as a broad-based program that applies the same review
and procedure to all mortgages and that (one would guess) will result
in a significant number of loan modifications, a government-trustee-asservice program cannot be understood as picking favorites or otherwise
raising the equal protection concerns that seem to underlie much of the
judicial and academic discourse regarding the law of regulatory takings." The government trustee program is closer to broad-based consumer banking regulation or income tax regulation -kinds of regulation that have never been held to effect regulatory takings -than it is to
the kind of narrowly focused land use prohibitions that have resulted in
findings of regulatory takings.
Fourth, the program would not result in wipeouts. To be sure,
when loans are modified to reduce principal and interest, junior
tranche interest holders in first mortgage securitized pools may be left
without any possibility that they will receive revenue on the basis of
the modified loans. But if a given mortgage in a pool is troubled
enough to meet the test for modification, the junior tranche interest
holders should have no reasonable expectation of actually collecting
any revenue even before the loan is modified. Moreover, if the relevant property interest for constitutional purposes is deemed to be the
mortgage pool and not the particular subset of mortgages within the
pool for which the loan terms are modified," it seems likely that the
(Sept 17, 2009) (statement of Susan Marlow on behalf of the Management Association for Private Photogrammetric Surveyors), online at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financial
svcs_dem/marlowtestimony.pdf (visited Oct 17, 2009) ("Foreclosures ... adversely affect
neighborhoods and communities through a rise in crime, theft, and vandalism, blight, and unsafe
health conditions.").
56

See Wright v Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va, 300 US 440,460-64

(1937) (upholding federal legislation that allowed for up to a three-year stay of foreclosure and
eviction of defaulting farmers).
57 See Lucas, 505 US at 1025 n 11 (emphasizing that the building restrictions did not apply
to existing homeowners and imposed hardship only on new purchasers of land where houses had
not yet been built); Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York, 438 US 104, 133-35

(1978) (explaining that the landmark designation process burdened not just Penn Central but a
significant number of properties throughout the city).
58 See Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 631-32 (2001) (rejecting "conceptual severance" of property into parts affected by regulation and parts unaffected, but also noting expressions of discomfort with this approach and relying upon the fact that the petitioner had framed
the relevant property interest as the parcel as a whole).
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investor in even very junior tranches will not be deprived of the entire
value of his or her property interest.
In addition, by stabilizing the residential real estate market generally, the government trustee plan would benefit junior tranche investors by reducing the likelihood of future defaults on other mortgages
in the pool. The government trustee program thus offers even junior
tranche investors something akin to the "average reciprocity of advantage" the Supreme Court invoked in Penn Central Transportation Co

v City of New York." Second mortgage holders also should benefit
from the stabilization of the housing market, inasmuch as they have a
strong stake in preventing current mortgages from entering default
and being foreclosed upon (in which case they very likely recover
nothing, given the drop already experienced in housing prices).
The argument that the government trustee program would not effect total wipeouts, however, would be strengthened if there were
some mechanism by which the junior tranche interest holders and the
holders of second mortgages would receive some payout when loans
are modified. To return to oil and gas field unitization, even holders of
a small surface area who likely could not have out-drilled their neighbors do receive a proportionate share of proceeds from the field once
it is managed as a single production unit. Following this analogy, a
government servicing program might provide as follows: when government trustees modify loans, they must try to quantify the expected
gain in doing so as compared to allowing foreclosure to continue, and
then they must direct a small percentage of the gain (set by a statutory
or regulatory formula) to junior tranche interest holders or holders of
second mortgages. For example, a flat 1 percent of savings over foreclosure could be reserved for second mortgagees.

59 438 US 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist dissenting) (noting that "average reciprocity of advantage" is achieved when "all [in the same position] are placed under the same restrictions ...
for the benefit of [society as a whole and] for the common benefit of one another"), quoting
Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393,415 (1922).
6o The Supreme Court has never resolved if cash payments or substitute development
rights figure into the analysis of whether the relevant property interest had been wiped out or if
they only figure into the analysis as to whether just compensation had been paid for a regulatory
taking. At least one current justice clearly favors the latter view. See Suitum v Tahoe Regional
PlanningAgency, 520 US 725,747-48 (1997) (Scalia concurring) (noting that "[i]f money that the
government-regulator gives to the landowner can be counted on the question of whether there is
a taking ... rather than on the question of whether the compensation for the taking is adequate,
the government can get away with paying much less").
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V. GOING FORWARD

Whatever is done or not done about the crisis related to current
mortgages, the question remains what, if anything, should be done to
avoid another round of over-fragmentation of mortgages in the future? How can we avoid another foreclosure crisis prompted or at
least lengthened and deepened by such over-fragmentation? There are
at least three general strategies that might be pursued, which I label:
better contracts, different fragmentation, and less fragmentation.
The "better contracts" strategy refers to PSA contracts. One
could imagine a model contract or agreement that allows loan modifications even without any explicit investor consent if certain conditions
are met, and that specifically authorizes or even requires principal
modifications when there have been widespread and substantial reductions in housing values. A model agreement also could include fee
structures that do not create incentives (or as great incentives, at least)
for servicers to either allow foreclosure where foreclosure could and
should be avoided and to avoid principal-reduction modifications
when those would be the only modifications that plausibly could succeed. Use of the model PSA could be mandated as a matter of state or
federal statute, although it is unclear, to say the least, whether state
statutory requirements would withstand federal preemption challenges. One immediate objection to such a strategy is that it might
make investment in mortgage pools less attractive to investors, and
hence might increase the cost of capital for financing mortgages. But if
recent experience has taught us anything, it would seem to be that
barriers to loan modifications can accentuate and prolong a decline in
housing value and in that sense, they create much more economic risk
for investors (and all of us) than they prevent.
The "different fragmentation" strategy builds on a recognition
that the division between mortgage servicing and ownership creates a
strong possibility of divergences of interests between servicers and
investors in mortgages however much PSA contracts are drafted to
align the interests of servicers and investors. As part of this strategy,
mortgage originators might be required to retain an ownership fragment in the individual mortgages they originate, and servicers would
be required to retain an ownership fragment in the mortgages they
service. This strategy entails not more or less fragmentation, as the
mortgages would still be divided up, but a statute that would constrain
who would hold fragments and how they would be held, in the interest
of avoiding some of the problems underlying our current foreclosure
crisis. The different fragmentation strategy, however, raises the question of how much and what kind of a stake must originators and ser-
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vicers retain in individual mortgages such that they would have an
interest in reasonable, net-social-wealth-maximizing loan modifications when housing prices drop. For example, if originators and servicers only retain the top or highest-quality (AAA-rated) tranche of the
mortgages, the retention of that ownership fragment may not incentivize them to avoid foreclosures inasmuch as their retained tranche
would be first to be paid off in full using the foreclosure proceeds.
The final strategy entails reducing the legally permissible fragmentation in the mortgage market. A great advantage of this strategy
is that it would reduce the complexity and complexity-related costs
that fragmentation creates. One relatively easy way to reduce fragmentation would be to discourage the creation of second mortgages at
the time of the original financing of the house purchase by prohibiting
borrowers from avoiding mortgage insurance requirements by means
of taking out a second mortgage. Other restrictions on second mortgages also might be possible. In addition, financial institutions that
originate mortgages could be limited as to the percentage of those
they securitize, and securitization of mortgages itself could be regulated to limit the degree of tranching and hence the degree of conflicts
between investors in different tranches. An even more drastic solution
would be the adoption by the United States and other countries of the
Danish system, whereby mortgage originators retain servicing of the
mortgages and ownership of the rights to any foreclosure proceeds
and the risk that foreclosure proceeds will not cover the outstanding
principal, and mortgage-backed bonds are issued solely in standardized form and solely as an investment in interest rate risk (rather
than creditworthiness)."
In theory, reducing the legally permissible degree of fragmentation could make financing real estate purchases more expensive, if we
believe that fragmentation attracts investors and hence increases the
overall pool available for financing mortgage borrowing. But, again,
61 See George Soros, Denmark Offers a Model Mortgage Market, Wall St J A15 (Oct 10,
2008) (explaining that in Denmark "mortgage originators are required to retain credit risk and to
perform the servicing functions, thereby properly aligning the incentives"); Karen Dubas, Can

Elements of the Danish Mortgage System Fix Mortgage Securitization in the United States? (Mar 26,

2009) (summary of a convention of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research),
online at http://www.aei.org/EMStaticPage/100028?page=Sumnmary (visited Sept 4,2009):
In Denmark, the credit risk of a loan is required to remain with the brokers or mortgage
bankers who originated the debt. Unlike in the current U.S. model, Danish mortgage originators are now invested in the credit worthiness of the loan; their interests become "perpetually aligned" with the borrowers, and they become de facto "liability advisers." The interest-rate risk in the loan is sold to bond holders.
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by reducing uncertainty and confusion and the possibility of housing
implosions, less fragmentation may have benefits that outweigh its costs:
less fragmentation may result in equal or even lower borrowing costs in
the housing market. Denmark may have unique qualities in terms of its
housing market, politics, and culture, but it bears note that the costs of
borrowing in Denmark, where fragmentation is minimal, are quite
competitive with those in the United States and other countries that
allow tremendous fragmentation. In any case, one thing is certain: we
should be thinking about possible tradeoffs and the best institutional
design now, rather than waiting passively for the next housing crisis.
CONCLUSION
Secured credit in homes has been divided and subdivided and
spun into so many separate interests that economically rational, socially beneficial modifications of loans are impossible. The mortgage
story is a new one but the excessive fragmentation of property and the
creation of waste and inefficiency is not new. And our legal tradition
has an answer in the form of an antifragmentation principle. Consistent with this principle, government trustees should be authorized to
review mortgages and, where modification would yield greater total
return than foreclosure, modify the loans. Blind trustee review, moreover, can be achieved without formal condemnations of property interests or the creation of government liability for regulatory takings.

62 See Soros, Denmark Offers a Model Mortgage Market, Wall St J at A15 (cited in note 61)
(discussing the "large and liquid market" for mortgage financing in Denmark).

